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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bryon Sanchez appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction for threats
against a public servant. Mr. Sanchez raised five issues on appeal:  (1) whether the district court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss due the facial overbreadth of I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b); (2)
whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence of the
prosecutor’s reaction to the threat; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by
admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of Mr. Sanchez’s prior conviction; (4) whether the
district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence of Mr. Sanchez’s
post-conviction petition; and (5) whether the accumulation of errors violated Mr. Sanchez’s due
process rights. The State responded. This Reply Brief is necessary to address some, but not all,
arguments raised in the State’s response.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Sanchez’s Appellant’s Brief previously articulated the statement of facts and course
of  proceedings.  (See App. Br., pp.2–6.) They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated here by reference.
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ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Sanchez’s motion to dismiss because I.C. § 18-
1353(1)(b) is facially overbroad?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence of
Mr. Thomson’s reaction to Mr. Sanchez’s letter?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
of Mr. Sanchez’s prior conviction for injury to a child?
IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence of
Mr. Sanchez’s post-conviction petition?




The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Sanchez’s Motion To Dismiss Because
I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) Is Facially Overbroad
Mr. Sanchez first argued the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
charge against him due to the criminal statute’s overbreadth. (See App. Br., pp.8–15.) He
asserted I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech because it
criminalized any threat of “harm,” which was vaguely defined by statute as “loss, disadvantage,
or injury.” I.C. § 18-1351(4). (App. Br., pp.11–14.) Based on the plain language of these terms,
and the absence of any limiting language, such as unlawful harm, Mr. Sanchez submitted there
was a realistic, substantial danger that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) compromised First Amendment
protections. (App. Br., pp.11–15.) As such, he contended the statute was facially overbroad. (See
App. Br., pp.8–15.)
In response, the State maintained I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) was not overbroad on its face.
(Resp. Br., pp.5–13.) The State argued, inter alia, three cases from other jurisdictions were
instructive: State v. Stephenson, 950 P.2d 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), People v. Janousek, 871
P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), and State v. Spottedbear, 380 P.3d 810 (Mont. 2016). (Resp.
Br., pp.10–13.) Mr. Sanchez respectfully disagrees. These cases have little, if any, persuasive
value for the State’s position.
First, Stephenson is not instructive because Washington’s statute contains a more limited
definition  of  harm  than  the  one  at  issue  here.  Revised  Code  of  Washington
(“RCW”) § 9A.76.180 prohibits the use of a threat to attempt or influence a public servant’s
vote, opinion, decision, or other official action. RCW § 9A.76.180(1). “Threat” is defined by
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statute in multiple ways,1 including “[t]o do any other act which is intended to harm substantially
the person threatened or another with respect to his or her health, safety, business, financial
condition, or personal relationships.” RCW § 9A.04.110(28)(j) (emphasis added). Examining
this definition, the Washington Court of Appeals held, “By targeting only threats of ‘substantial
harm,’ the challenged portion of the statute is narrowly tailored to address the overall problem it
seeks to correct.” Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 42 (emphasis added). The court reasoned, “It prohibits
only those threats related to future decision making and to substantial interests. It does not
encompass  threats  of  harm based  upon past  decisions.  Nor  does  it  prohibit  threats  to  do minor
injury to the official’s financial situation or other protected interests.” Id. at 42–43 (emphasis
added). Unlike the statute in Stephenson, I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) does not target only threats of
“substantial” harm. It targets all “harm,” no matter how minor or insignificant. Along the same
1 Threat also means: “[t]o communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use
force against any person who is present at the time,” RCW § 9A.76.180(3)(a), or
to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:
(a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other
person; or
(b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or
(c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement
or restraint; or
(d) To accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted
against any person; or
(e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending
to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
(f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; or
(g)  To  testify  or  provide  information  or  withhold  testimony or  information  with
respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or
(h) To take wrongful action as an official against anyone or anything, or
wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or
(i) To bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other similar collective action
to obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group
which the actor purports to represent . . . .
RCW § 9A.04.110(28)(a)–(i).
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lines, Washington’s statutory scheme further limits the substantial harm to specific areas:
“health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationships.” RCW §
9A.04.110(28)(j). Idaho’s statute has no such limitation. Harm is broadly defined as “loss,
disadvantage, or injury” with no restrictions. I.C. § 18-1351(4). In light of Stephenson’s
emphasis on the statute’s prohibition of only “substantial” harm, Stephenson is not instructive to
uphold I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) as constitutional.
Moreover, Stephenson’s  comparison  of  the  Washington  statute  with  a  separate,
invalidated city ordinance supports the determination that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is facially
overbroad. Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 43–44. A Seattle municipal ordinance prohibited the use of a
threat to compel or induce a person (1) to engage in conduct that he or she has a right to abstain
from or (2) to abstain from conduct that he or she has a right to engage in. Stephenson, 950 P.2d
at 43 n.5; see also City of Seattle v. Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1117 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(reviewing, and striking down, ordinance as overbroad). This ordinance used the same
definitions of “threat” as the Washington statute, RCW § 9A.76.180. Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 43
& n.5. But, looking at all of the threat definitions as a whole, the Washington Court of Appeals
had struck down the ordinance as facially overbroad. Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 43; see also Ivan,
856 P.2d at 1118–23. The Stephenson court distinguished the overbroad ordinance from
Washington’s statute due to, in large part, the “substantial” restriction to harm. For example, the
court explained that the ordinance prohibited coercion against any person, while RCW §
9A.76.180 prohibited “[t]he threat of substantial harm  to  a  public  servant’s  ‘health,  safety,
business, financial condition, or personal relationship,’ which “jeopardizes” “[t]he public’s
interest in open and fair government decision making.” Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 43. Next, the
court considered that its prior decision to invalidate the ordinance examined all definitions of
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“threat” as a whole, not only the one subsection of substantial harm. Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 43–
44. The court recognized that the vast threat definitions in the ordinance “prohibited ‘such a wide
range of speech that it is impossible to find its proscriptions reasonable.’” Id. at 44 (quoting Ivan,
856 P.2d at 1120).2 In contrast, the single subsection of “substantial harm” was not specifically
targeted in its prior opinion striking down the ordinance. Id. “And,” the court noted, threats of
substantial harm “are distinguishable” from the ordinance “in that they must be substantial, not
threats that merely embarrass or inconvenience their target.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the
threats of harm do not need to be “substantial.” A threat that merely embarrasses or
inconveniences a public servant will easily suffice because it falls under the vague, expansive
terms of “loss, disadvantage, or injury.” Therefore, Stephenson is not instructive on the State’s
position and, if anything, lends support to a determination that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is facially
overbroad.
Next, Janousek is equally unpersuasive because Colorado’s statute again contains
narrower definition of harm. Colorado criminalizes an attempt to influence a public servant “by
means  of  deceit  or  by  threat  of  violence  or  economic  reprisal  against  any  person  or  property,”
with the intent to alter or affect the public servant’s “decision, vote, opinion, or action
concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by him or the agency or body of
2 For example:
the prohibition against accusing another of a crime could “proscribe prosecutors
from plea bargaining,” the prohibitions against exposing or publicizing facts and
revealing significant information could “impinge on freedom of the press to
release information,” the prohibition against testifying or providing information
about a legal claim could “discourage a witness from testifying,” and the
prohibition against threats to strike and boycott could “chill the ability of groups
to engage in boycotts and collective bargaining.”
Stephenson, 950 P.2d at 44 (quoting Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1120).
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which he is a member.” 871 P.2d at 1192 n.6. The Colorado Supreme Court held the statute was
not facially overbroad. Id. at 1193. In upholding the statute, the court identified that the statute
“clearly prohibits a person from using deceit or threats of violence or economic reprisal to
influence a public servant’s actions.” Id. The court then reasoned, “The statute is narrowly
tailored  to  enable  the  People  to  proscribe  the  type  of conduct that rises to a level of criminal
culpability.” Id. (emphasis added). The court further held that the statute placed a “minimal
burden” on the exercise of First Amendment rights, and there was “no constitutionally protected
right to make threats of violence to a public servant.” Id. In sum, Janousek held that any
overbreadth in the statute was not real and substantial because the statute prohibited the use of
unlawful conduct. The statute here contains no unlawful conduct limitation. Again, I.C. § 18-
1353(1)(b) prohibits threats of “loss, disadvantage, or injury” to a public servant. See I.C. § 18-
1351(4) (defining harm). There is no requirement that the threatened harm rises to a level of
criminal culpability. Accordingly, Janousek, like Stephenson, demonstrates why the broad
definition of “harm” for I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is unconstitutional.
Lastly, Spottedbear provides little guidance because it addresses an overbreadth
challenge in the context of a post-conviction appeal. The petitioner argued his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge Montana’s threats to public servants statute as
unconstitutionally overbroad. 380 P.3d at 814–15. Although the petitioner appears to have made
similar arguments as Mr. Sanchez, and the statute is similar as well, the Montana Supreme Court
examined whether counsel’s decision not to challenge the statute was objectively reasonable. Id.
at 814–16; see also Mont. Code. Ann. § 45-2-101(27) (defining harm as “loss, disadvantage, or
injury or anything so regarded by the person affected, including loss, disadvantage, or injury to a
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person or entity in whose welfare the affected person is interested”). This is a different analysis
than whether the statute itself is constitutional. The court explained:
Spottedbear asserts that his counsel had “no plausible” justification for failing to
raise a constitutional challenge because it would have ended Spottedbear’s
prosecution at its inception. But [Mont. Code. Ann.] § 45-7-102(1)(a)(i) . . .
serves a plainly legitimate purpose—to deter people from threatening harm to a
public servant in order to influence that person’s actions as a public servant.
Spottedbear acknowledges that his conduct falls within the statute’s legitimate
sweep. Given these surrounding circumstances, and our overbreadth precedent
discussed above, Spottedbear’s trial counsel reasonably may have concluded that
an overbreadth challenge to the statute would not have been successful.
Spottedbear, 380 P.3d at 815–16. The court recognized that the petitioner “would have a high
hurdle to clear” to show real and substantial overbreadth. Id. at 816. The court also recognized
that the petitioner could not overcome the presumption of objectively reasonable assistance with
“the mere fact” that the petitioner could “conceive of some impermissible applications of the
statute.” Id. (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). But, most importantly, the court
stated, “We decline to consider the statute’s alleged overbreadth in this appeal.” Id. The court left
any constitutional deficiencies for another case because the petitioner’s conduct “plainly came
within the statute’s legitimate sweep.” Id. Thus, Spottedbear is not instructive for this case
because it expressly declined to rule on the statute’s constitutionality. Like Janousek and
Stephenson, this Court should not consider Spottedbear as  persuasive  authority  for  the  State’s
position.
In summary, Mr. Sanchez submits Stephenson, Janousek, and Spottedbear offer no
support to the State’s position that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is constitutionally valid. Mr. Sanchez
maintains I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is facially overbroad due to the expansive statutory definition of
harm. For the reasons stated herein, and in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Sanchez asserts the district
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court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of threats against a public servant due to
I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b)’s facial overbreadth.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Irrelevant Evidence Of Mr. Thomson’s
Reaction To Mr. Sanchez’s Letter
Mr. Sanchez does not reply herein and respectfully refers this Court to his argument in
his Appellant’s Brief on this issue. (App. Br., pp.15–20.)
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Irrelevant And Prejudicial Evidence Of
Mr. Sanchez’s Prior Conviction For Injury To A Child
Next, Mr. Sanchez argued the district court failed to apply the correct legal standards and
therefore abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the nature of his prior felony conviction:
injury to a child. (App. Br., pp.20–29.) The State responded the nature of Mr. Sanchez’s prior
conviction was relevant to motive and intent, any unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative
value, and any error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.25–36.) Mr. Sanchez replies to some, but not
all, of the State’s arguments.
The State initially asserted the evidence of the crime as injury to a child “had no more
tendency to indict Sanchez’s character” than the evidence that Mr. Sanchez was imprisoned as a
result of a serious criminal offense. (Resp. Br., p.29.) Mr. Sanchez contends evidence of a
conviction for injury to a child does “indict” his character more than evidence of an unspecified
felony conviction and imprisonment. As asserted in his Appellant’s Brief, crimes against
children are particularly inflammatory. (App. Br., pp.27–28.) Without specific evidence on the
nature of the felony, the jury would not have known Mr. Sanchez lost custody of his children
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because he committed the offense of injury to children. It is far less prejudicial for the jury not to
know the specific felony and simply assume that some felony offense, including those unrelated
to harming children, led to the loss of custody.
Second, the State argues Mr. Sanchez’s conviction for injury to a child was relevant to
intent and motive. (See Resp. Br., pp.30–33.) The State asserted:
Evidence that Sanchez was convicted of injury to a child in the case prosecuted by
Mr. Thomson tended to make it more probable that Sanchez had a motive to
threaten harm to Mr. Thomson and his family, that he intended the statements
about Mr. Thomson and his family as threats, and that he made the threats in
order to influence Mr. Thomson to take action to assist in restoring Sanchez’s
freedom and reuniting him with his own children, who had been removed from
his care as a result of his injury to a child  conviction.
(Resp. Br., p.31.) The State similarly stated, “[E]vidence that Sanchez had been convicted of
injury to a child in the case prosecuted by Mr. Thomson was relevant to demonstrate both why
Sanchez may have been inclined to threaten harm to Mr. Thomson and that he intended by the
statements in his letter to do so.” (Resp. Br., p.32.) The only way, however, to reach the State’s
proposed motive and intent to threaten harm is to consider Mr. Sanchez’s conviction for injury to
a child as propensity evidence. Evidence that Mr. Sanchez had been convicted of injury to a child
is only relevant to demonstrate Mr. Sanchez’s motive and intent if the nature of the conviction is
given special significance. Otherwise, there is nothing distinguishable between one felony
conviction and another. There is no reason why Mr. Sanchez “may have been inclined to threaten
harm to Mr. Thomson” and “that he intended by the statements in his letter to do so” unless the
nature of the conviction itself—injuring a child—demonstrates a propensity to harm (or threaten
to  harm)  others.  Therefore,  Mr.  Sanchez  maintains  the  district  court  failed  to  apply  the  correct
legal standards by admitting irrelevant evidence of the nature of Mr. Sanchez’s prior conviction.
(See App. Br., pp.20–27.)
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In addition, Mr. Sanchez disputes the State’s contention that the limiting instruction
properly instructed the jury on the purpose of this evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.32–33, 34–35.) The
district court instructed the jury:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant
committed acts other than that for which the defendant is on trial. Such evidence
is not to be considered by you to prove the defendant’s character or that the
defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence may be considered
by you only for the limited purpose of proving the defendant’s motive and/or to
demonstrate the underlying facts and circumstances giving rise to the charge
and/or to prove the existence and nature of the proceedings from which the state
claims the defendant was seeking relief.
(R., p.266.) This instruction thus informed the jury that it could consider the nature of
Mr. Sanchez’s prior conviction for motive. As explored above, and in the Appellant’s Brief, any
consideration of the prior conviction as “motive” leads to its consideration as propensity
evidence. Accordingly, this instruction was, at best, confusing to the jury and, at worst,
sanctioning the jury’s use of propensity evidence under the guise of motive. Mr. Sanchez submits
this instruction did not properly instruct the jury or cure any error because this evidence was
plainly inadmissible.
Finally, Mr. Sanchez argues the probative value of this evidence did not substantially
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. (See App. Br., pp.27–28.) The nature of the felony as
injury to a child is “more damning” than the fact of a serious, but unspecified, felony. (See Resp.
Br., p.36.) In addition, Mr. Sanchez submits the State did not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the erroneous admission of this evidence was harmless. (See Resp. Br., pp.35–36.)
Mr. Sanchez contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting this irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence. (See App. Br., pp.20–29.)
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IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Irrelevant Evidence Of Mr. Sanchez’s
Post-Conviction Petition
Fourth, Mr. Sanchez argued the district court failed to apply the correct legal standards
and thus abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his pending post-conviction petition,
which challenged his prior conviction for injury to a child. (App. Br., pp.29–32.) Mr. Sanchez
contended  this  evidence  was  irrelevant,  and  the  State  could  not  show  this  error  was  harmless.
(App. Br., pp.29–32.) The State responded that the evidence was relevant and, even if in error,
any admission was harmless. (Respt. Br., pp.37–39.) The State’s response is unremarkable, and
Mr. Sanchez respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant’s Brief on this issue. (App.
Br., pp.29–32.)
V.
These Errors In The Aggregate Deprived Mr. Sanchez Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Finally, Mr. Sanchez respectfully refers this Court to his argument in his Appellant’s
Brief on the aggregation of the errors and their prejudicial effect. (App. Br., pp.32–33.)
CONCLUSION
Due to the facial overbreadth of I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b), Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss and remand this
case for an order of dismissal. In the alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial in light of the evidentiary errors.
DATED this 6th day of December, 2018.
                                    /s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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